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ABSTRACT:  
 
 
How does international migration impact on the composition of the demos? Constitutional 
doctrines and democratic theories suggest contrasting responses: an insular one excludes 
both non-citizen immigrants and citizen-emigrants; a deterritorialised one includes all 
citizens wherever they reside; a postnational one, all residents and only these. This article 
argues that none of these predicted responses represents the dominant pattern of 
democratic adaptation, which is instead a level-specific expansion of the national franchise 
to include non-resident citizens and of the local franchise to include non-citizen residents. 
We demonstrate this by analysing an original dataset on voting rights in 31 European and 
22 American countries and outline a level-sensitive normative theory of citizenship that 
provides support for this pattern as well as a critical benchmark for current franchise 
policies. Our findings can be summarised in two inductive generalisations: (1) Voting rights 
today no longer depend on residence at the national level and on citizenship of the 
respective state at the local level; (2) Voting rights do, however, generally depend on 
citizenship of the respective state at the national level and on residence at the local level. 
We call these the patterns of franchise expansion and containment. The former supports 
the idea of widespread level-specific expansion of the franchise and refutes the insular 
view of the demos. The latter signals corresponding level-specific restrictions, which 
defeats overgeneralised versions of deterritorialised or postnational conceptions of the 
demos. In order to test how robust this finding is, we analyse cases where the dominant 
patterns of expansion have been resisted and where unexpected expansion has occurred. 
With regard to the former, we identify constitutional and political obstacles to voting rights 
expansion in particular countries. With regard to the latter, we show that even where 
national voting rights have been extended to non-citizen residents, containment remains 
strong through indirect links to citizenship.  
 
KEYWORDS: Immigrants; Emigrants; Voting rights; Europe: Latin America 
  
3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
International migration impacts on state populations in two ways: immigration adds non-
citizens to the resident population and emigration adds non-residents to the citizenry. The 
resulting incongruence between resident and citizen populations depends not only on the 
size of migration but also on the stickiness of citizenship status, since the latter does not 
automatically change with taking up residence abroad. Citizenship laws determine the 
discrepancy through conditions for loss of a citizenship of origin through renunciation or 
withdrawal and conditions for acquisition of host country citizenship through naturalisation 
for first generation immigrants and ius sanguinis or ius soli for their descendants.  
 
The disjuncture between the two types of state populations is recognised and regulated in 
international law through combining a basic right of states to territorial jurisdiction over all 
residents with their right to offer diplomatic protection to their nationals abroad and their 
duty to readmit them. International law has, however, very little to say about the impact of 
migration on the composition of the demos, i.e. the population that enjoys voting rights.2 
While equal voting rights for women and other formerly disenfranchised categories have 
become enshrined in human rights conventions, the inclusion of non-citizens and non-
residents has been largely left to democratic self-determination.3 This has produced 
different types of “discrepant electorates” (Caramani and Strijbis 2013) across democratic 
states.  
 
The traditional democratic answer to the migration challenge is that the demos consists of 
all adult citizens who reside in the territory and only of these. This “insular” view of the 
demos implies that both non-residents and non-citizens should never be granted the right 
to vote. By contrast, constitutional doctrines and democratic theories have increasingly 
defended an “expansive” conception of the demos, although their views of how the demos 
should adapt to the challenge of migration are often at odds with each other. Constitutional 
Courts in Austria and Germany have struck down laws that denied or restricted voting 
rights of citizens residing abroad4 as well as bills that would have introduced local voting 
rights for non-EU citizens.5 These judgments reflect a “deterritorialised” view of the demos, 
according to which citizenship is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the 
franchise. Democratic theorists have often defended the opposite view that all those and 
only those subjected to the laws have a claim to political representation (López-Guerra 
2005, Abizadeh 2008, Beckmann 2009, Owen 2012). This principle suggests a 
“postnational” view of the demos according to which residence rather than nationality 
should determine voting rights.  
 
In this paper we argue that none of the views summarised above matches the actual 
pattern of democratic responses to the migration challenge, which consists in level-specific 
expansion of the demos: Non-residents tend to be included in the national franchise and 
excluded from the local franchise. Conversely, non-citizens are often included in the local 
                                                          
2 We use the terms franchise or suffrage as synonyms for the right to vote and distinguish them from 
candidacy rights, which are sometime also called “passive voting rights”. 
3 Exceptions are Art. 41 of the 1990 UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families, promoting external voting rights of migrants and Art. 6 of the 1992 Council of 
Europe Convention on Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level, foreseeing local voting rights 
for non-citizens. Both Conventions have had rather limited success.  
4 Austria VfSlg 12.023/1989, Germany BVerfG, 2 BvC 1/11, 4 July 2012 
5 Germany BVerfGE 83, 37, 31 October 1990, Austria VfSlg 17.264/2003 
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franchise, but not the national one. We argue that this empirical pattern is compatible with 
a normative theory that acknowledges the multilevel structure of democratic polities 
exposed to migratory movements. Our analysis is based on an original dataset for 53 
democratic states in Europe and the Americas. What we find can be summarised in two 
inductive generalisations: (1) Voting rights today no longer depend on residence at the 
national level and on citizenship of the respective state at the local level; (2) Voting rights 
do, however, generally depend on citizenship of the respective state at the national level 
and on residence at the local level. We call these patterns of expansion and containment. 
The former supports the idea of widespread level-specific expansion of the franchise and 
refutes the insular view of the demos. The latter signals corresponding level-specific 
conditionalities, which defeats overgeneralised versions of the deterritorialised or 
postnational conceptions. Diagram 1 illustrates these level-specific patterns. 
 
 
Insert diagram 1 about here 
 
 
Our main goal in this article is to provide descriptive evidence and normative support for 
the level-specific expansion of the demos. We do not offer an explanatory theory of demos 
expansion that would have to test hypotheses about norm diffusion and political actors’ 
interests. In order to bolster the salience of our descriptive account we will, however, pay 
special attention to negative cases where expansion has been resisted or where we find 
an unexpected form of expansion (i.e. national voting rights for non-citizens or local voting 
rights for non-residents). At the end of the essay we suggest how a level-sensitive 
“genuine link” theory can provide normative support as well as critical benchmarks for the 
observed prevalent pattern of expansion and containment.  
 
Our approach is original in three ways. First, we distinguish between national and local 
elections and argue that there are contrasting empirical patterns as well as normative 
principles for each level. Second, we transcend the geographical divide of the discipline 
and show how comparing countries in Europe and the Americas beyond the idiosyncrasies 
of their respective regional environments yields fruitful insights. Third, our approach puts 
equal emphasis on non-residents’ and non-citizens’ voting rights and examines for the first 
time how they combine. The social and political science literature on migration and 
citizenship is still mostly separated into a dominant focus on immigrants and their relation 
to host countries and a smaller but growing field of diaspora studies analysing the relation 
between emigrants and their countries of origin. This separation is problematic for 
understanding citizenship both from the migrant and the state perspective. International 
migrants are, by definition, at the same time immigrants and emigrants. Any study of 
migrant citizenship should therefore take into account migrants’ relations to both sending 
and receiving countries. Similarly, nearly all democratic states experience both immigration 
and outmigration and citizenship as well as electoral laws reflect this dual experience. As 
we will see, in certain cases policies towards emigrants directly influence those towards 
immigrants or vice versa. 
 
The article is divided into five sections. After this introduction the next one introduces our 
datasets and coding methods and presents the general trends of expansion of the 
franchise to both non-residents and non-citizens. While our comparative overview shows 
considerable support for a level-specific expansion of the suffrage, the outcome is by no 
means universal. In Sections 3 and 4 we therefore turn to deviant cases: Section 3 
discusses instances where expansion failed to materialise as a result of constitutional or 
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political hurdles. Section 4 examines those rare cases where expansion occurred at 
unexpected levels and shows how these exceptions rather confirm the rule that citizenship 
is a condition for the national franchise and residence for the local one. In the fifth and final 
section we ask whether the expansion of the franchise can be supported by democratic 
principles of inclusion and which, among the possible combinations of voting rights that we 
study empirically, should be normatively preferred. 
 
EXPANDING THE FRANCHISE BEYOND CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCE 
 
Our original dataset covers all European states that belong to the European Single Market 
apart from Liechtenstein, i.e. the 28 Member States of the European Union, Norway and 
Iceland, which participate in the European Economic Area, and Switzerland whose citizens 
have the same rights as EEA nationals. In the Americas we include all countries apart from 
the Caribbean island states. Although we will sometimes refer to cases outside our set of 
53 states, focusing on Europe and continental America makes sense for studying how 
democracies adjust the boundaries of the demos in response to migration. Most countries 
in our set have experienced large scale immigration or emigration and have been stable 
democracies for several decades. These criteria might suggest including also Australia 
and New Zealand, but full coverage of (Western) Europe and (continental) America allows 
us better to compare continental patterns generated by shared history and diffusion 
processes. We draw extensively on the EUDO Citizenship collection of electoral laws, 
country reports and a comparative typology of restrictions of the franchise for resident 
citizens, non-citizen residents and non-resident citizens (Arrighi, Hutcheson and Piccoli 
2015).6 The quantitative part of our analysis is based on a new set of indicators, the 
coding rules for which are fully explained in Appendix 1. 
 
Our indicators cover only the right to vote and not candidacy rights and consider only 
eligibility for the franchise, i.e. the legal definition of the category that is entitled to vote, 
leaving aside questions of access (voter registration and voting methods). We do not 
differentiate between types of elections (legislative, presidential/mayoral, and 
referendums). Wherever non-citizens or non-residents enjoy the franchise in one type of 
election at a given level, we count this as a case of expansive citizenship. Finally, we do 
not consider issues of voter representation, i.e. how votes are aggregated into 
parliamentary seats in legislative elections, or outcomes in presidential and plebiscitary 
elections. All these dimensions are important for determining the inclusiveness of voting 
rights. They are, however, secondary for our present purpose, which is to determine the 
external boundaries of the demos. Inclusiveness of the demos is a matter of degree, while 
membership in the demos is a dichotomous variable. In other words, even if non-citizens 
and non-residents face many obstacles for casting their vote and have unequal 
representation compared to resident citizens, the fact that they have an equal right to vote 
still signals an expansion of the demos beyond the insular conception.  
 
Our dataset consists of two basic variables: non-citizen franchise and non-resident 
franchise. The former refers to voting rights for anybody who is not a citizen of the country 
where the election is held; the latter to voting rights of citizens who do not have a 
                                                          
6 Available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu [last accessed 12 May 2016]. The EUDO CITIZENSHIP observatory 
has also published ELECLAW indicators measuring the inclusiveness of electoral rights (EUDO 
CITIZENSHIP observatory 2015, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/electoral-rights/electoral-law-
indicators [last accessed 12 May 2016). At the time of writing, these were only available for the 28 EU 
member states. For the present paper, we have therefore coded simpler binary indicators that serve well 
enough for our purpose. 
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residence in the country and who can vote from abroad, counting thus as negative cases 
those where only registered residents can vote from abroad or where non-residents can 
cast their vote only inside the country. For each of the two variables we distinguish further 
whether the respective voting rights can be exercised at local level only, at national level 
only or in both local and national elections. We rule out regional elections at substate level 
(provinces) as well as at supranational level (for the European, Andean, Mercosur and 
Central American Parliaments) for two reasons. First, not all state territories are subdivided 
into regions where democratic elections are held and not all states are members of 
supranational unions with parliaments, whereas all states in our set have local elections. 
Second, the franchise in substate regional elections is often regulated by regional rather 
than national law. We would thus find that in the same state some regions include non-
resident voters or non-citizen voters whereas others don’t.7  
 
The final distinction is between restricted and unrestricted voting rights. As explained 
above, there are many possible restrictions of the franchise that we do not take into 
account. In addition to those already mentioned, we do not count restrictions that apply 
equally to resident citizen voters (such as exclusion of criminal offenders or mentally 
handicapped persons). Yet, for our purpose, it is essential to know whether a non-citizen 
franchise is fully disconnected from citizenship or still depends on having the nationality of 
particular other countries, in which case we code it as restricted. Conversely, for non-
residents we call the franchise restricted if, in addition to being citizens, voters have to 
meet a residence condition (prior residence in the country, a maximum duration of 
residence abroad or an intention to return). We also check for restrictions of the franchise 
for non-resident voters on grounds of citizenship. This refers to cases where naturalised 
citizens or dual citizens cannot vote from abroad or have to meet additional conditions. 
Restrictions of this kind are frequent in the Americas for candidacy rights, but we have not 
found any for active voting rights. Where the right to vote from abroad is granted only 
exceptionally to occupational categories, such as diplomats, civil servants or military 
personnel abroad, we count this as a negative rather than a restricted case,8 just as we do 
if non-residents have to travel home to cast their vote in the country. We could have 
strengthened the evidence for expansion by counting also these instances of voting rights 
for non-resident citizens, but we do not think that laws that tie an absentee franchise 
closely to presence in the territory or service for the state should be regarded as evidence 
for deterritorialisation.  
 
To sum up, we have four basic variables: the non-citizen franchise and non-resident 
franchise at local and national levels. We register for each country whether it grants voting 
rights and if so whether these are restricted or unrestricted. This results in 81 logically 
possible combinations. We exclude from further analysis those where non-residents can 
vote only in local but not in national elections and where non-citizens can vote only in 
national but not in local elections. These expansions are the opposite of the expected 
ones. They do not exist in our dataset and we would be surprised to find instances of such 
constellations anywhere in the world.9   
                                                          
7 This problem may also arise at local level, although less often. Where municipalities of the same country 
have different voting regimes, we code the local franchise that exists in the majority of municipalities (see 
coding rules in Appendix 1, online edition).  
8 Denmark is a borderline case. Voting rights from abroad are granted to diplomats, posted workers and 
students as well as their Danish spouses and generally to Danes who intend to return within 2 years. In our 
coding rules, the latter provision counts as a residence-based restriction of a non-citizen franchise. 
9 A Schumpeterian view that each demos can determine its own composition (Schumpeter 1942/1976: 245) 
might expect that within a sufficiently large sample some local and national demoi will decide to expand in 
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In Table 1 we have grouped together instances of a multilevel franchise which results in  
25 combinations. Let us first consider the expansion of the franchise for non-citizens and 
non-residents separately and without taking restrictions into account. What we find is, first, 
strong confirmation of expansion: four-fifths (82.1 per cent) of the countries in our sample 
disconnect the national franchise from residence by extending it to expatriates almost as 
many (42, that is 79.3 per cent) disconnect the local franchise from national citizenship by 
granting to categories who are not citizens of the state. Second, there is even stronger 
evidence for containment: 83% retain the strict condition that voters in national elections 
must be national citizens and only one country in our set (Norway) allows citizens without 
domicile or residence to vote in local elections. As we will discuss in section 4, there have 
been a few cases in the past where expatriates could vote also at the local level, and 
future cases may emerge with new opportunities for municipalities to include absentees 
through electronic voting.  
 
 
Insert table 1 about here 
 
 
The Venn diagram below provides a further condensed version of the results which 
focuses on restricted vs. unrestricted expansions of the franchise, leaving out the empty 
cells for a non-resident local franchise and lumping together local and national voting 
rights. 
 
 
Insert diagram 2 about here 
 
 
The most striking finding that emerges from this diagram is that 35 states (66%) combine 
both extensions of voting rights (the intersecting areas in the centre of the diagram), 
whereas only three Central American states (5.7%) retain the traditional insular conception 
of the demos that includes only resident citizens. 16 states (30.2%) combine an 
unrestricted franchise for all non-resident citizens in national elections with similarly 
unrestricted voting rights for non-citizens in local elections (the grey area of the diagram). 
Unrestricted level-specific expansion of the kind portrayed in diagram 1 represents thus 
the most frequent type in our sample, whereas insular demoi have become very rare. We 
expect to find many more instances of the latter in Asia and Africa, but it is remarkable that 
there are so few among the old democracies of Europe and America that have been 
exposed to migration for a long time. Among the three, Suriname became independent 
only in 1975 and both Guatemala and Nicaragua have experienced longer spells of non-
democratic rule than most other states in the region (Escobar 2007). 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, it is again in the Americas where we find the most 
expansive franchise. The strongest one among the 53 cases exists in Ecuador since the 
constitutional reform of 2008. The country currently grants unrestricted voting rights in 
national elections for Ecuadorians abroad as well as local and national voting rights for 
non-citizen residents (including those without regular residence permit) after 5 years. It was 
recently joined by Chile, where non-citizens have enjoyed the right to vote in local and national elections 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
these unusual ways. Our conjecture that they do not exist is thus based on our substantive views about 
level-specific dynamics of franchise expansion. 
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after five years of residence since 1983 and where, after a 2014 constitutional reform, Parliament granted 
unrestricted voting for non-resident citizens in presidential elections and national referendums in August 
2016.10 
Let us now examine continental patterns in more detail. The overall lesser variation of 
franchise combinations in Europe is partly due to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that granted 
voting rights in local elections to EU citizens residing in other member states. We included 
these voting rights, which are restrictive according to our coding rules, since our question 
is whether the franchise depends on the condition of nationality of the state where the 
election is held. Moreover, it is the member states which have adopted the EU Treaties by 
unanimity and have thereby accepted enfranchisement of non-citizens in local elections.  
 
If we consider only the local franchise for third country nationals, we find 14 European 
states (12 of which in the EU) that have extended the local suffrage to all categories of 
long term residents, either based on the length of legal residence (ranging from 3 to 8 
years), or the acquisition of a permanent resident status (Slovakia, Slovenia). Switzerland 
is not included in this category because non-citizens can vote only in a minority of 
cantons.11 UK, Ireland and Portugal offer a restricted franchise for certain third country 
nationalities and 13 states do not grant voting rights for non-EU citizens. However, in 
several of the latter (e.g. in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Greece) there have been 
sustained attempts to introduce a more general local franchise for third country nationals 
(Arrighi et al. 2013: 63-5). The picture is more mixed in the American context, where 7 
countries out of 22 have extended local voting rights to all long-term residents. It should be 
noted that these countries are all located in South America, which suggests a 
neighbourhood effect and regional norm diffusion (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015). 
 
The principle that the franchise for non-citizens depends on reciprocity can be found in a 
small minority of European and American states. It applies to local voting rights in Bolivia 
and Spain, and to national ones in Brazil/Portugal (since 2003) and UK/Ireland (since 
1983). The franchise for Commonwealth citizens in the UK, Belize and Guyana in local 
and national elections is a unilateral extension that is not based on reciprocity. In Europe 
there is also the earlier instance of a reciprocity-based local franchise among the Nordic 
countries, which does not show in our table since these states now grant local voting rights 
also to third country nationals. 
 
In the Americas there are two countries where the local franchise depends on legislation 
by federal provinces which may, but do not have to, grant voting rights to non-citizens. 
These are Argentina where a large majority of provinces have used this opportunity and 
the marginal case of the US where the alien suffrage was introduced in a handful of 
Maryland municipalities, which remains far below our 50% threshold for territorial units and 
is thus not recorded in our tables.  
 
Examining the franchise for non-residents, unrestricted extension to citizens abroad is 
about equally frequent in the Americas and in Europe. The number of countries that do not 
grant any such franchise to expatriates (or grant it only to those who return to cast their 
vote inside the country) is substantially higher in the Americas (6) than in Europe (4). 
                                                          
10 The reform was passed in the Chilean Parliament on 3 August 2016.  Non-resident citizens now can 
participate in Presidential elections and national referendums but not in parliamentary elections, unlike in 
Ecuador where they can directly elect their own representatives through reserved seats in Congress.  
11 Non-Swiss long term residents can vote in local elections in seven cantons: Neuchâtel since 1848, Jura 
since 1978, Appenzell Ausserrhoden since 1995, Fribourg and Graubünden since 2003, Geneva and Basel-
Stadt since 2005.  
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Canada is the only American country with a restricted franchise for its permanent citizens 
abroad and it is an extreme case since voting rights expire already after 5 years. In 
Europe, 21 states now let their expatriates vote in national elections (presidential, 
legislative or referendums) from abroad, without restrictions based on qualifications or past 
residence. Only 3 states still reserve this right to civil servants (Malta, Ireland and Cyprus) 
while another 6 apply more or less severe residence qualifications. Ranked from most 
restrictive to most inclusive, these are Denmark, Iceland, UK, Sweden, Germany and 
Norway. 
 
Our comparative analysis can be summarised as follows. First, the data suggests that the 
“insular conception” of the demos has become largely obsolete, with only three states 
reserving the right to vote at both levels to their own citizens and tying it to a strict 
residence condition. Second, there is some evidence for an emerging postnational 
conception of the demos with voting rights for non-citizens restricted to nationals of 
specific countries in 37.7% of the cases and expanded to all long-term non-citizens in 
41.5%. However, this phenomenon has remained essentially limited to local elections, 
which casts doubts on the idea that it represents a broader postnational trend. Conversely, 
the rapid proliferation of external voting legislation observed in the literature has been 
nearly exclusively confined to national elections. Although two thirds of all states grant the 
national suffrage to all their citizens abroad and another 13.2% apply residence 
qualifications, only Norway has extended that right to local elections.  
 
Let us finally categorize our sample by how well cases match the pattern sketched in 
Diagram 1. The expected level-specific expansion and containment applies to a majority of 
30 states (56.6%); in 11 cases (20.8%) we find the expected containment but expansion at 
only one level; in another 10 countries (18.9%) there is a postnational or deterritorialised 
expansion of the franchise that defeats the containment expectation; and in only 3 insular 
cases (5.7%) there is no expansion at all.12 
 
RESISTANCE TO EXPANSION 
 
Though present in a majority of states put under scrutiny, the disconnect of the national 
franchise from residence and of the local franchise from citizenship has not occurred in all 
countries. In this section, we turn to those cases that have resisted either forms of 
expansion and successively examine how constitutional hurdles and party politics have 
contributed to this outcome.   
 
In the 1990s a number of scholars attributed the extension of rights to non-citizens to the 
postnational impact of human rights norms (Soysal 1994, Jacobson 1996) or the epistemic 
community of lawyers who acted as the guardians of liberal principles in the domestic 
politics of democratic states (Joppke 1999, Hollifield 2004). With regard to the expansion 
of the local franchise to non-citizen residents, however, national courts have typically 
played the opposite role. Through a conservative reading of constitutional norms, they 
often blocked or even reversed liberal legislation already adopted in parliament. A well-
known example is Germany, where the enfranchisement of resident aliens was high on the 
political agenda throughout the 1980s. The controversy found its denouement in 1990 
when decisions of the city-state of Hamburg to grant voting rights to aliens who could 
document eight years of residence and of the province of Schleswig Holstein to extend the 
local suffrage to selected nationalities on the basis of reciprocity were struck down by the 
                                                          
12 The list of countries in these four categories is provided in Table 2 in Appendix 3 (online edition).   
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German Federal Constitutional Court. The court found that all elections must be 
representative of the “people” consisting of German citizens (Benhabib 2004, Shaw 
2007). In 2004, the Austrian Constitutional Court struck down a much more modest 
proposal to grant third country nationals voting rights for the 23 local district councils of the 
city of Vienna referring to article 1 of the Constitution according to which “Austria is a 
democratic republic. Its law emanates from the people” (Stern and Valchars 2013). More 
recently in Greece, the 2010 legislation extending the suffrage to long-term residents was 
invalidated by the Greek State Council in November 2012 on the grounds of violating the 
principle of sovereignty of the Greek people (Triandafyllidou 2014).  
 
By contrast, the requirement to reside in one’s country to be entitled to vote there has 
hardly ever been entrenched as a constitutional principle. The disenfranchisement of 
expatriates was mostly not due to explicit restrictions limiting the right to vote to residents 
alone but to the failure of states to implement legislation enabling voting from abroad 
(Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015). Hence, domestic courts have often forced governments to 
take the necessary measures in order to provide equal voting rights and fair representation 
for all citizens, independently of their country of residence. In Austria, for instance, external 
voting rights were introduced after a 1989 judgment of the Constitutional Court finding that 
the exclusion of non-residents from the electoral register violated the norm of equality of 
citizens (Stern and Valchars 2013: 3). In these contexts, the constitutionally entrenched 
principle of universal suffrage for all citizens functioned as a two-edged sword facilitating 
the enfranchisement of non-residents as much as it impeded introducing that of resident 
aliens. Besides, constitutional traditions seem to have created very different dynamics with 
regard to expanding the demos in European and American contexts. In South American 
states, historic openness for immigration and contemporary concerns about the rights of 
emigrant citizens in the US and Europe have led to a discourse promoting emigrants’ as 
well as immigrants’ rights, including those of political participation (Acosta Arcarazo and 
Freier 2015).  
 
A constitutional perspective, however, is insufficient for understanding the numerous cases 
where political parties from both sides of the political spectrum have agreed to reform the 
constitution in order to let aliens vote – as happened in Belgium and the Netherlands 
(Jacobs 2000) – or where they were unable to implement external voting legislation in 
spite of constitutional provisions urging them to do so, as in Greece (Christopoulos 
2013). This leads us to highlight the role of political parties as a second crucial factor 
shaping the boundaries of the demos. 
 
According to Christian Joppke, the political left has campaigned for the expansion of 
immigrants’ rights whereas the right has been more inclined to strengthen the bonds with 
expatriates (Joppke 2003: 431-2). Especially in Europe, left parties have long advocated 
extending the right to vote to non-citizens not only on ideological grounds but also for more 
prosaic electoral purposes (Ireland 1994), whereas centre right parties have been more 
prone to support restrictive measures, even where there is no significant far right electoral 
challenge (Bale 2008: 3020). In the absence of a cross-party consensus, left parties often 
failed to break the constitutional deadlock reserving the franchise to citizens, even when in 
government. The case of France, where the Socialist party has advocated the extension of 
local voting rights to long-term residents since 1981 and yet never managed to mobilize a 
two thirds parliamentary majority necessary for reforming the constitution, provides a 
telling example (Arrighi 2014). 
 
There are several exceptions, of which we will only mention two. In Estonia, where a large 
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proportion of Russian-speaking residents became stateless at the time of independence, 
the extension of local voting rights to resident aliens was supported by right wing parties, 
which saw it as a means to legitimize restrictive rules of acquisition of citizenship (Canetti 
2014). By providing a compensatory route to political representation, they successfully 
sought to alleviate international pressures to liberalize their nationality laws. In Uruguay 
and Chile, national voting rights were originally granted to (predominantly European) 
immigrants by authoritarian leaders who expected their electoral support (Escobar 2015, 
Echeverria 2015).  
 
The ideological colour of political parties has played an equally ambiguous role in 
extending external voting rights. On the one hand, the electoral behaviour of expatriates, 
and therefore the potential electoral implications of their mass enfranchisement, is largely 
unknown prior to their enfranchisement. The Italian right, which pushed for the 2001 
introduction of external voting in national elections assuming that it would be electorally 
rewarded, learned this lesson the hard way. In the 2006 general elections, the scale of 
mobilisation together with a clear partisan preference for centre left parties among a 
newly-represented electorate of Italians abroad came as a surprise to most. Ultimately, the 
ballots cast abroad tipped the electoral balance in favour of the coalition led by Romano 
Prodi, precipitating the fall of Silvio Berlusconi’s second right wing government (Battiston 
and Mascitelli 2008: 265). On the other hand, progressive parties have often played a key 
role in the enfranchisement of expatriates in the aftermath of regime change. In Spain, 
Argentina, Peru and Brazil, left-wing parties were fervent supporters of out-of-country 
voting, which they portrayed as symbolic reparation for the political exiles of the Civil War 
and their descendants (Escobar 2007). In other Latin American countries, democratisation 
processes from the 1980s onwards provided grassroots activists and leftwing parties with 
a window of opportunity to extend the right to vote in national elections to citizens abroad 
(Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010), to the detriment of incumbent right wing governments 
who long resisted their political incorporation. Joppke’s hypothesis that centre right 
governments promote ethnicisation of citizenship by including diasporas whereas left wing 
governments endorse de-ethnicisation through promoting immigrant naturalisation and a 
non-citizen franchise (Joppke 2003) is, thus, plausible for Europe but not for Latin America 
(Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015). 
 
We conclude that national legal and political obstacles to franchise expansion seem to be 
well entrenched in particular states but that the broader forces pushing towards reform are 
present even in countries resisting the trend. 
 
EXCEPTIONS TO CONTAINMENT 
 
Our comparative overview shows that what we have called containment (i.e. the enduring 
link between citizenship status and national franchise, and residence and local franchise 
respectively) is empirically even stronger than the converse phenomena of expansion. In 
this section, we will focus on the rare exceptions and show why they provide indirect 
support for the salience of the link. 
 
The extension of the local suffrage to non-residents is extremely rare. In our sample, 
Norway provides the only example of a local franchise for citizens without current 
residence in the country, although the pool of potential voters is greatly reduced by a 
cumbersome registration procedure and a strict past residence requirement, which 
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excludes second and third generation emigrants born abroad.13 Recently, some Mexican 
states also experimented with a highly restrictive version of a local franchise for non-
residents. For example, the state of Michoacán had permitted former residents to vote in 
local elections in 2007 and 2014 but abolished this option in 2014 due to high costs and 
low turnout (Pedroza 2015: 7). On the European side, Spain provides a case where the 
suffrage was as inclusive in local elections as in national ones until 2011, when a reform of 
the legislation established the residence requirement for the local franchise in 
unambiguous terms. The reform was promoted by the Galician nationalist party Bloque 
Nacionalista Gallego (BNG). The BNG was adversely affected by the vote of Galicians 
abroad who represented 15 percent of all registered voters in the province in 2014 – and 
over 25 percent in some municipalities – and tended to favour the state-wide conservative 
Partido Popular (PP). The BNG managed to convince an overwhelming majority of 
Spanish MPs that the external local suffrage constituted a “democratic anomaly which did 
not exist anywhere else in Europe” and unduly diluted the preferences of the resident 
population.14 The reform was also legitimised by a growing awareness that “many 
Spaniards abroad did not know Spain”, a problem that was aggravated by legislation 
granting citizenship status to successive generations of emigrant descent in 2002 and 
2007 (Rubio Marin et al. 2015). As a result, in 2012 only one third (33.6 per cent) of the 1.9 
million Spanish citizens registered in the electoral census of “absent residents” [sic] were 
actually born in Spain. (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2012). 
 
At first glance, the nine states in our sample that have opened the gate to the national 
franchise to all long term residents or to selected nationalities suggest that the link 
between citizenship and national voting rights is less strong. Among them, two pairs of 
countries, the UK/Ireland and Portugal/Brazil, have extended the franchise in all types and 
levels of elections on the basis of reciprocity, in recognition of historical links and cultural 
affinities. In addition to Irish citizens, the UK also enfranchises all Commonwealth citizens 
who hold, or do not need to hold, an Indefinite Leave to Remain in the UK, a provision that 
is often reciprocated in other Commonwealth countries, two of which are included in our 
dataset: Belize and Guyana (Khadar 2013: 10). The privileged position of these categories 
of non-nationals is a consequence of the UK’s imperial history rather than based on any 
particular cultural or linguistic ties. As former colonies, Dominions or Overseas Territories 
gradually became independent states over the course of the 20th century, the peculiar 
franchise arrangements were preserved and updated (Shaw 2009). In any case, the 
restrictive scope of the policy with its distinction of nationality-based categories 
demonstrates how citizenship remains a sine qua non condition of the franchise. 
 
The absence of franchise restrictions based on nationality in the legislation of Ecuador, 
Chile and Uruguay constitutes a stronger deviation from the containment rule. However, a 
closer examination of eligibility criteria and of the circumstances under which the extension 
of the franchise occurred shows a somewhat different picture. In Uruguay, the conditions 
under which non-residents are eligible to vote are more demanding than those for 
naturalisation. Depending on whether they have family in the country, foreign nationals can 
naturalise after 3 or 5 years of habitual residence, but if they do not choose to become 
citizens, they need 15 years of residence for the franchise in addition to requirements of 
                                                          
13 For the full list of eligibility conditions and detailed registration procedure see the English version of the 
Norwegian government’s web portal, available at https://www.regjeringen.no/en/portal/election-portal/the-
norwegian-electoral-system/id456636/#5 [last accessed 31 March 2016].  
14 Quoted in ‘El BNG urge modificar el voto exterior antes de las municipales’, Crónicas de la Emigración, 12 
April 2010, available at  http://www.cronicasdelaemigracion.com/especiales/galicia/reforma-voto-
exterior/20100812104639027216.html [Last accessed 12 May 2016].  
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family formation in the country, good behaviour and property or professional activity 
(Margheritis 2015: 7). Besides, the enfranchisement of long term residents was introduced 
already in 1934, under the conservative dictatorship of Gabriel Terra, who sought to gain 
electoral support among relatively wealthy European immigrants who were reluctant to 
naturalise. Similarly, in Chile non-citizens were granted the right to vote in 1980 by 
General Pinochet, who sought to allow a comparatively small population of Europeans to 
participate in the referendum ratifying an autocratic constitution that enabled him to remain 
in power for another eight years (Escobar 2007: 932-3).  
 
The only case in our sample15 which comes close to a full separation between citizenship 
status and the national franchise is Ecuador, where since 2008 all foreigners who can 
document at least five years of residence can vote, although not stand as candidate. The 
reform was part of a broader change of the electoral code, which also extended the 
suffrage to non-resident citizens. These are now not only able to cast a ballot from abroad 
but vote for their own representatives in the national Parliament. However generous the 
legislation may be, the enfranchisement of foreign residents was not the expression of a 
genuine desire to resolve a democratic deficit by encouraging the participation of a 
traditionally excluded group of residents. Instead, it was meant to produce a demonstration 
effect towards host states of Ecuadorian emigrants whom the government pressured to 
reciprocate (Echeverria 2015). A similar strategy has been observed in other cases, such 
as South Korea where the extension of the local suffrage was introduced with the aim of 
nudging Japan to grant its sizeable Korean community local voting rights (Mosler and 
Pedroza 2016) – although the intended demonstration effect has not been achieved. Even 
if the outcome of these reforms is a full separation of the franchise from citizenship status, 
their motivation seems to have been the promotion of political representation of the 
country’s own citizens abroad. 
 
All exceptions to containment that we have found in our sample retain thus in some way 
the links between local franchise and residence and between national franchise and 
citizenship.  
 
NORMATIVE SUPPORT FOR A LEVEL-SPECIFIC EXPANSION OF THE FRANCHISE 
 
The puzzle stated in the introduction is that there seem to be very clear patterns of level-
specific expansion and containment of the franchise that none of the current legal or 
political theories predict or support. We conclude our analysis by outlining an alternative 
democratic theory that distinguishes between birthright-based national and residence-
based local citizenship and that provides normative support to the observed differentiation 
of the franchise. 
 
As one of us has argued elsewhere, an expansive franchise does not make the demos 
shapeless, but can put it instead into the right shape in societies with significant mobility 
and relatively sedentary majority populations (Bauböck 2015). Both expansions respond to 
the same problem that international migration undermines the legitimacy of a demos 
consisting only of resident citizens, but they do so in diverging ways, by reaching out to 
emigrants at the national level and to immigrants at the local one.  
 
                                                          
15 Only New Zealand has an even more inclusive franchise for non-citizen residents in national elections 
after one year of permanent residence. However, even in this case, citizenship remains a condition for 
candidacy rights (Barker and McMillan 2014).  
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The normative argument supporting extension of the franchise in contexts of migration is 
that democratic polities should include as members all those and only those who have 
genuine links to the polity in the sense that their autonomy and well-being depends on the 
collective self-government and flourishing of the political community (Bauböck 2007, 
2015). Migrants’ claims to inclusion at the national level can be understood when 
considering their genuine links to two states. By taking up permanent residence in a polity, 
immigrants become ‘citizenship stakeholders’ with a claim to political inclusion and 
participation. Conversely, emigrants who take up residence abroad do not automatically 
lose genuine links to their country of origin.  
 
At the national level, this normative perspective is compatible with the predominant 
containment pattern. Voting rights can legitimately depend on citizenship status if 
emigrants do not lose this status by taking up permanent residence abroad and if 
immigrants are entitled to acquire it through naturalisation under fair conditions. What 
explains then why, at the local level, voting rights can be disconnected from citizenship but 
not from residence? 
 
The difference between national and local polities lies in their external environment and 
conditions for their collective self-government. In order to be self-governing, states must be 
recognised as equal members of the international state system, while municipalities are 
internally dependent polities that are self-governing insofar as they have democratic 
authorities elected by local citizens and legislative competencies in local matters.  
 
In the international state system, the legal status and protection of rights of individuals 
depends fundamentally on being recognised as a citizen of a state (Arendt 1967: 267-303) 
and this explains why it is so important for migrants not to lose their citizenship of origin 
when gaining access to the citizenship of the country where they settle. In the European 
Union, there is a higher-level citizenship that protects internal migrants, but this EU 
citizenship is derivative from member state nationality and does not undermine the 
protective function of national citizenship in relations with third countries. At the global level 
no such encompassing citizenship exists.  
 
By contrast, self-governing municipalities are nested within states and cannot provide their 
local citizens with external protection and rights without subverting equal citizenship at the 
state level. For the same reason, they also cannot discriminate internally between natives 
and immigrants or require that newcomers have to naturalise before being granted local 
citizenship. This ‘origin-blindness’ of local citizenship makes it possible and reasonable to 
disconnect it from nationality altogether and to derive it instead from residence. Finally, 
because of their smaller size, the impact of mobility on the mismatch between residents 
and natives is stronger in municipalities than in nation-states. There are many cities but 
few states where majorities of the population are born outside the territory and where a 
majority of native-born live permanently outside that territory. Conceiving of all residents 
and only residents as stakeholders in local self-government restores democratic legitimacy 
where sedentary populations have become minorities. 
 
The proposed distinction between national and local citizenship is, however, primarily 
about the relations between polities rather than about their size. When Florence was a 
republic, it was surrounded by walls and considered the citizens of Siena or Pisa as 
enemies. For the city of Florence today, immigrants from Sicily, Romania or Somalia are 
all primarily residents with the same claim to local services and inclusion in the political 
community. For the Italian Republic, however, Sicilians are Italian nationals, Romanians 
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enjoy special citizenship status because of Italy’s membership in the EU, while Somalians 
are extracomunitari with a claim to naturalisation. Distinctions that are arbitrary and 
therefore discriminatory at the local level are necessary and therefore justified at the 
national level. 
 
The normative argument that we have proposed supports the extension of the franchise to 
non-resident citizens in national elections and to non-citizen residents in local elections. 
Among the many different combinations that we have found empirically, we can thus 
identify a specific bundle of voting rights for migrants that we regard as normatively 
desirable16: This is the combination of an unrestricted franchise for emigrants in national 
elections with an unrestricted franchise for immigrants at the local level. In our dataset we 
find 16 countries that fall into this category; the percentage is 32.3% in the EU and 27.3% 
in the Americas. Our normative argument does, therefore, not merely support 
retrospectively an existing pattern, but provides a critical benchmark that is met by only a 
minority of the cases.  
 
Moreover, it would be premature to say that these countries meet all normative 
requirements for an inclusive demos and that other arrangements can never be justified. 
We have coded as “unrestricted” the absence of special conditions apart from citizenship 
for eligibility to vote in national elections and the absence of special conditions apart from 
residence for eligibility at local level. This does not imply that either citizenship or 
residence status are themselves unconditional or that eligibility is all that matters. 
 
First of all, there is a concern about over-inclusiveness of the external franchise due to 
unlimited ius sanguinis transmission of citizenship to subsequent generations born abroad. 
A genuine link criterion suggests that ius sanguinis should no longer apply to the third 
generation born to parents themselves born abroad. Second generation minor children, 
however, need their parents’ citizenship to preserve their options of return and to protect 
them in case of return (Dumbrava and Bauböck 2015). There is no similar justification for 
enfranchising them at the age of majority if they have never lived in the country. Second 
generation emigrants should therefore not acquire voting rights without any past or future 
residence condition. 
 
An analogous argument against over-inclusiveness can be applied to the local franchise. 
Where it is unrestricted, it depends on residence rather than on citizenship (of the state, a 
supranational union of states, or another state with a reciprocal franchise). But, like 
citizenship, residence status itself is a legal fact rather than a social one. As argued by 
Robert Dahl, transients, such as tourists or travelling business people, have no claim to be 
included in the demos (Dahl 1989: 129). Unlike national citizenship, the residence status 
that qualifies for voting in local elections must not depend on meeting conditions for 
naturalisation and an individual decision to apply. It should be acquired automatically after 
some time of lawful residence. ‘Some time’ is necessary so that newcomers can 
sufficiently acquaint themselves with local political life to cast their votes responsibly. 
Based on this consideration, there can be reasonable gradations of the required time 
between internal migrants who are national citizens, internal migrants within a 
supranational union and third country immigrants. Current conditions under which EU 
migrants can exercise the local franchise in most Member States soon after arrival are 
over-inclusive in this respect.  
                                                          
16 A full discussion, for which we do not have enough space here, would need to distinguish further which 
forms of expansion and containment are normatively required and which are permissible. 
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As with national citizenship, there is not only a problem of over-inclusiveness, but also of 
unjust exclusion of individuals who qualify under a stakeholder conception of political 
membership. Immigrants without legal status often live and work in a municipality for many 
years as all other long-term residents and ought to be treated like these. City sanctuary 
movements protecting residents from deportation in the U.S. and Canada illustrate that a 
principle of residence-based citizenship is widely endorsed in civil society and local 
politics. The same principle supports individual claims to regularisation after some time of 
residence. Former undocumented migrants would thereby be automatically included in the 
local demos while being set on the road to national citizenship and voting rights at a later 
point in time.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have found strong empirical evidence that voting rights at national level no longer 
depend on residence but continue to depend on citizenship status, whereas the local 
franchise conversely no longer depends on citizenship status but strongly depends on 
residence. Exceptions do exist but we have argued that they generally confirm the 
underlying principles. Our sample of 53 European and American states is broad, but of 
course not fully representative for all democracies worldwide. We know that outside 
Europe and the Americas we will find many more cases of extension of the franchise to 
non-residents but rather few where noncitizens have been granted voting rights.17 
 
Our most important conclusion is that standard assumptions in theories and comparative 
studies of democratic citizenship need to be revised by paying symmetrical attention to 
emigration and immigration contexts and differentiating between national and local levels 
of citizenship. As we have shown, this is not merely necessary for normative theories of 
democratic inclusion but also for understanding how real world democracies have 
responded to the impact of migration on their demoi.  
 
Our analysis should be of interest not only to the comparative study of political rights and 
“realistic” normative theories of migration and democracy (Carens 1996, Little and 
Macdonald 2015) but also to research on immigrant integration and transnationalism. For 
the latter, it sheds important light on the institutional conditions under which migrants 
develop practices of political engagement in relation to countries of residence and origin. 
Our data cannot answer the question of whether migrants who vote in home country 
elections tend to be less or equally politically engaged in their country of settlement 
(Chaudhary 2016), which feeds into the broader debate about political assimilation and 
transnationalism (Portes and Haller 2003, Waldinger 2015). Yet behavioural studies of 
immigrants’ transnational political participation often ignore variations in the institutional 
opportunity structure, e.g. regarding conditions for naturalisation or dual citizenship. We 
have shown that a surprisingly large number of democracies offer opportunities for such 
                                                          
17 The spread of external voting legislations in national elections is a truly global phenomenon, which 
accelerated considerably in the past 25 years (Lafleur 2015). While less frequent, the enfranchisement of 
non-residents can also be found in other world regions. In Asia, the practice was pioneered in 2005 by South 
Korea when it introduced local voting rights for foreigners who have held a permanent residence permit for at 
least three years (Mosler and Pedroza 2016). In Africa, Malawi grants voting rights in all elections to 
foreigners after 7 years of residence, while the 2011 reform of the Moroccan Constitution provides for an 
extension of the local suffrage to non-citizens, although no implementing legislation has been passed to 
date. The globally most inclusive non-citizens franchise exists in New Zealand. For a global overview of non-
citizen voting legislations, see Earnest (2006).   
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simultaneous engagement through local and transnational voting without requiring prior 
naturalisation of immigrants or cutting emigrants off from national elections. Alongside the 
strong trend towards toleration of dual citizenship by sending and receiving countries,18 the 
expansive franchise patterns that we have found provide stark evidence for the 
transnationalisation of citizenship statuses and rights.  
 
Whether and how this affects voting patterns is another important question that has been 
rarely addressed by mainstream scholarship on electoral behaviour. The inherent difficulty 
of collecting data on geographically dispersed transnational migrants has meant that the 
partisan preferences of these new voters are largely unknown. Existing research suggests 
that immigrants in Western Europe and North America tend to favour left-wing parties, 
despite the fact that they are not more likely to support increased social spending and that 
they often endorse more conservative views on cultural issues than the native population 
(Dancygier and Saunders 2006). Regarding emigrants, a recent case study on Bolivian 
expatriates found that their experience abroad contributed to shaping not only their own 
perception of home-country elections, but also those of their non-migrant relatives through 
‘electoral remittances’ (Lafleur and Sánchez-Dominguez 2015).  
 
Last but not least, our findings raise at least two important questions in the field of party 
politics: How have political parties contributed to our twin patterns of expansion and 
containment and how have they sought to adapt to the new rules of the game? In order to 
address the former issue, one must move away from a binary variable of expansion versus 
containment and examine instead how political parties who are negatively affected by the 
enfranchisement of a new electorate have sought to curb the electoral impact through a 
variety of electoral engineering strategies, such as reducing participation rates through 
cumbersome registration procedures and voting methods or reducing the electoral weight 
of migrants’ ballots through a higher ratio of votes required for winning reserved seats 
(Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015). Even if such schemes are designed to diminish emigrants’ 
electoral representation they will at the same time enhance their substantive 
representation as a distinct group and may thus make legislators and parties more 
responsive to their interests. Overall, depending on the size of ‘discrepant electorates’ 
(Caramani and Strijbis 2013) produced by a deterritorialisation of national demoi and an 
inclusion of non-citizens in local demoi, political parties should have incentives to pursue 
distinct electoral strategies in national and local arenas – a hypothesis that could be easily 
tested empirically.  
 
Our study does not only matter for these core fields of political science, it also needs to be 
further developed. For a future research agenda we see five desirable extensions: first, a 
broadening of geographic scope by including other regions of the world; second, using the 
more fine-grained ELECLAW indicators (EUDO CITIZENSHIP 2016) for analysing degrees 
of inclusiveness; third, combining these indicators with datasets on independent variables 
to test causal hypotheses about general conditions for expansion or containment of the 
franchise; fourth, longitudinal data that capture the timing of franchise reforms and allow 
studying trends and norm diffusion in a way that a cross-sectional analysis cannot do; and 
fifth, in-depth analysis of pivotal cases of expansive citizenship or resistance against 
                                                          
18 See Global Dual Citizenship Database (2015) published by the Maastricht Centre for Citizenship, 
Migration and Development (MACIMIDE), available online at https://macimide.maastrichtuniversity.nl/dual-
cit-database/ [last accessed 31 March 2016]. 
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extensions in order to identify the agents, interests and mechanisms driving policy 
changes.  
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Table 1: Non-citizen and non-resident franchise in the Americas and Europe 
 
Table 1: Non-citizen and non-resident franchise in the Americas and Europe 
 
non-citizen franchise N (%) 
 
 
 
monolevel (local only) 
multilevel  
(national and/or local) 
 
 
none restricted unrestricted restricted unrestricted  
 
none 
Guatemala 
Nicaragua 
Suriname 
Cyprus 
Greece  
Malta 
 
Belize 
Guyana 
Ireland* 
Uruguay 
10 (18.8) 
 
monolevel 
(national only) 
restricted Canada Germany 
Denmark 
Iceland 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom  
6 (11.3) 
no
n-
re
sid
en
t f
ra
nc
hi
se
 
  
 
 unrestricted 
El Salvador 
USA  
Costa Rica 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Panama 
Switzerland 
Austria  
Bolivia  
Bulgaria  
Czech Republic 
Spain  
France  
Croatia  
Italy  
Latvia  
Poland  
Romania 
Argentina 
Belgium 
Colombia 
Estonia 
Finland 
Hungary 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Peru 
Paraguay 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Venezuela 
Brazil 
Portugal 
Chile 
Ecuador 
 
36 (68.0) 
 
multilevel 
(national and/or 
local) 
restricted 
  Norway   
 
1 (1.9) 
unrestricted 
     
 
   0 (0) 
  N (%) 
 
11 (20.7) 15 (28.3) 18 (34.0)   5  (9.4) 4 (7.5) 53 (100) 
 
Note: * noncitizen franchise in Ireland is unrestricted in local but restricted in national elections 
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Diagram 2: Restricted and unrestricted expansion of voting Rights
 
 
 
 
